Chapter 1
Philosophical Motivation §1.1. Introduction A common feature of traditional tense logics is that the truth-evaluation of a sentence is made at a moment of time or at best at a sequence of moments of time. The need of interval logics (i.e., tense logics which deal with sentences being true or false at intervals of time) has been stressed not only by so-called tense logicians but also by many researchers of linguistics, artificial intelligence, etc. either implicitly or explicitly. See, e.g., Bennett and Partee (1972, 1978) , Bruce (1972) , Dowty (1977) , Gabbay (1976, p. 175) , etc. Although many authors have discussed how to analyze several sample sentences since 1972, there is no formal system of interval logic with an exact syntax and semantics comparable with traditional tense logics. For example, Bennett and Partee (1978, pp. 53-54) have written as follows:
"One prominent inadequacy of the paper is that it does not provide a compositional syntax and semantics of the constructions treated.... The truth conditions we gave for sample sentences of various types, even if correct, reflect the joint contribution of a host of such factors; separating out the individual contributions of the parts and how they fit together is a much harder task which remains to be done. " Bruce has stated as follows (1972, p. 24): "Prior's tense logics are developed in terms of operators corresponding to "before" and "after". What tense logics result from operators corresponding to other time-segment relations?"
The main purpose of this paper is to answer these urgent requirements, i.e., we present some interval logics with exact syntax and semantics and establish their semantical completeness in this paper.
Our plan of the rest of this paper goes as follows. In the next section we present a minimal explanation on our own fundamental philosophical position, say, temporal dualism. The main interval logic which we advocate in this paper is IM, which will be discussed in Chapter 3. The interval logic I, which will be discussed in Chapter 2, is of interest, partly because it stands in the opposite extreme to traditional tense logics, and mainly because the formal discussion of I is to a considerable extent in parallelism to that of IM. In Chapter 4 we will show that many tense operators discussed in the literature are definable within our formal system IM. In this section we will give a sketch of how to deal with tenses in English in the formalism of IM. § 1.
2* Temporal Dualism
The main purpose of this section is to give a brief explanation on our philosophical or linguistical position, called "temporal dualism", upon which our formal study of interval logics is to be based. Roughly speaking, temporal dualism means the idea that all sentences are classified into two classes, say those being true or false only at moments of time on the one hand, and those being true or false only at intervals of time on the other hand. A sentence of the former class is called an M-sentence, while a sentence of the latter class is called an l-sentence. Propositional variables should range only over sentences of the simple present tense, which we call atomic sentences, because sentences of other tenses should be constructed from such atomic sentences with the aid of relevant tense operators. An atomic sentence which is an M-sentence is called an -sentence ("s" for "state (of affairs)"), because most of such sentences are the prepositional counterparts of the notion of a state (of affairs) such as seen in von Wright (1963, chap. 2) . Some examples of s-sentences are:
(1) Tom is in New York. Practically we can identify s-sentences with sentences of the simple present tense which can not take the present progressive tense.
An atomic sentence which is an I-sentence is called a ^-sentence ("p" for "process"), because most of such sentences are the propositional counterparts of the notion of a process such as seen in Rescher and Urquhart (1971, chap. 14) . Some examples of p-sentences are: Practically we can identify p-sentences with sentences of the simple present tense which can take the present progressive tense. It is very interesting to notice that we usually do not utter such p-sentences, at least, in the reportive sense, as Bennett and Partee (1972) has stressed. By way of example, we usually say "it is raining now" rather than "it rains now". The present progressive tense operator, which we denote by ING, can apply exclusively to I-sentences and then yield M-sentences. The sentences that we can utter in the reportive sense are only M-sentences.
Practically we can distinguish between M-sentences and I-sentences by considering whether the sentence at issue can take the present progressive tense. That is, if it can take the present progressive tense, then it must be an I-sentence. If it can not take the present progressive tense, then it must be an M-sentence. Therefore, as Bennett and Partee (1972) has suggested, all sentences of other tenses than the simple present tense that we can utter in the reportive tense are M-sentences. For example, the following sentences are M-sentences. 
Chapter 2
The Propositional Logic I §2.1. Formal Language LI Definition 2.1.1. Our formal language LI consists of the following symbols:
(a) a countable set P of (prepositional) variables: p, q, ]?',...; (b) classical connectives: ~i, -»; (c) tense operators: /(n, x, y), where n, x and y range over all natural numbers such that 1 < x < y < n; (d) parentheses: ( , ). (c) If for any !</< j<n, A tJ is a wff, so too is I(n, x, y)(A l2 ,..., A (n . 1)n ) 9 where A t fs are arranged in lexicographical order with respect to (/, /)• In the rest of this paper we use parentheses in a very loose manner so as to make wffs easier to read. We should notice that I(n, x, y) is a n^n~ ^-ary tense operator. For the sake of notational simplicity, we will often write I(n, x, jO({^ij}i<f<j<H) or I(n, x, y)({A tJ }) rather than I(n, x, y)(Z l2 ,..., (»-DK)-We will make use of Ie(n, x, yJdA^}) as an abbreviation of i/(n, x, j;)({-i^4 fj -}), just as GA is an abbreviation of -iF~iA in traditional tense logic. Symbols for conjunction (A), disjunction (v), and material equivalence («->) are defined as usual. T and F are defined as abbreviations of (p-»p) and (P~*P) f°r some variable p respectively. We will make use of ordinal notations
comment. We write p and A rather than p and A so as to stress that p and A represent propositions being truth-evaluated at intervals. § 2.2. Semantics for I Definition 2.2.1. A Tl-structure is a triple (S, <, D), where (a) S is a set (called the "time"). (b) < is a strict linear order in S (the earlier-later relation). That is, < is an asymmetric, transitive and connected binary relation having S as its underlying set. (c) D is a function from P x I(S, <) to {0, 1}, where 1 stands for truth, 0 for falsity, and I(S, <) = {(s, i)\s<t and s, t e S}. That is, D assigns a truth-value to each variable at each interval. We will often write D(p 9 s, 0 rather than D(p, (s, f)). Definition 2.2.2. Given a Tl-structure (S, <, D), the truth-value of a wfT A at an interval (s, t) 9 notation: ||^4||( S>r) , is defined by induction as follows: With this definition, it is easy to see that :
(e) \\Ie(n 9 x, j)({l^})|| (s>0 = l iff for any s/s (l<z<n) such that 5 B , s x = s and s y = r, ||^./||( Slf5J ) = l for some (i,j).
X^ ^23
the distinguished reference interval Figure 1 .
the distinguished reference interval Figure 2 . By way of example, the situations depicted in Figures 1-3 are represented as follows :
(1) 7(3, 1,2)(1 125 1 13 ,1 23 ). A theory is a set of wffs. This section is devoted to the definitions around the notion of a Dl-sequence, which will be of importance to us. (c) (s, r) is an interval of (S, <), i.e., s, teS and s<L (2) A Dl-set (S' 9 <, (s, r)) is called a Dl-sufcse* of a Dl-set (S, <, (s ? f)) if (S', <) is a restriction of (S, <) as an ordered set, i.e., S' is a subset of S and s ; < f in S" iff s 7 < f in S for any s', *' e S'. The notion of a Dl-subsequence will be very useful to study such situations as that in Example 2.2.5 from a general viewpoint. = (0(s'), 0(O) ^ some (s, t)e/(S, <) and (s', t')e/(S', <):
We denote by CS(a, a', s l5 ^) the totality of sums of a and a' with respect to (s l5 ^) that are canonical. It is important to notice that CS{a, a', s ls ^) is a finite set provided a and a' are finite (i.e., the cardinalities of S and S' are finite).
The notion of a sum will be very useful in dealing with such situations as that in Example 2.2.6 from a general point. Definition 2.3.6. Let a = (5, <, (s, 1), Q) and <x' = (S', <, (s', f), 0') be DI-sequences and /be an order monomorphism from (S", <) to (S, <). Then the immersion of a' into a at (s' l5 £i)e/(S', <) with respect to / is the Dl-sequence cc" = (S, <, (5, 0, O"), where O"(/(si), /(*i)) = fl(/(5i), /W)) A fl'^i, t'J while Q"(s, 0 = ^(5, 0 for any other (s, t)e!(S, <). We denote by 7Af(cc, a', /) the totality of immersions of a into a' with respect to/.
The notion of an immersion will be useful in dealing with such situations as that in Example 2.2.7 from a general point. §2.4. Formal System I The main purpose of this section is to present the formal system I. To do it smoothly, we need some notational conventions.
Given a finite Dl-sequence a=(S, <, (s, f), O), we can easily find out the canonical Dl-sequence a'=([l, ri], <, (1, r), Q') such that a'«a. We will denote the wff J(n, x, y)({Q'(i, j)}) by /(n, x, y) (a) or /( , , )(a). That is,
Definition 2.4.1. Our formal system I consists of the following (inference) rules and axioms (or exactly, axiom schemata):
Rules:
where AIJ=A for some (i, j).
Axioms: 9 where -4^=5 A ^y s while 4y=AJy for any other (/, j).
where a' is a Dl-subsequence of a. By the way, it is very interesting and instructive to notice that each tense operator Ie(n, x, y), if separated completely from other tense operators, is very similar to that of Gabbay's system E [n] . As for £ (14) and (15) Proof. By induction on the construction of the proof. I.e., it is sufficient to prove that all the axioms of I are valid and the rules of I preserve validity.
Since it is almost straight, it is left to the reader as an exercise.
The rest of this section is devoted thoroughly to the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 2.5.2 (Completeness of I). A theory I is consistent iff it is realizable.

Corollary 2.5.3. For any wff A, \-A iff
Here in order to establish the strong completeness of I, we will use a mixture of the tableaux method and the so-called classical Henkin method (say, Henkin (1949) ). To do it smoothly, several definitions and lemmas are in order.
Now we define several notions around that of a TDI-sequence. Very roughly, a Dl-sequence was a Dl-set with an assignment of wflfs to intervals, while a TDI-sequence is a Dl-set with an assignment of theories (i.e., sets of wffs) to intervals. is also a finite set for any (s, i)eI(S, <).
canonical as a Dl-set.
Definition 2.5.5. Let A = (S, <, (s, t), W) and A' = (S', <, (s f , I
9 ), W) be TDI-sequences and (s l9 r 1 )e/(S, <). Then a sum of 1 and X' with respect to (s 1? tj is a triple (A",/, g) (or simply, A"), where
1 P" is defined as follows :
(i) In the case (s", t") e/(S", <) is such that (s", O = (/(*), /(O) = fe(*'), 0(O) for some (s, OeI(S, <) and (s', f')e/(S', <): 
By taking the contraposition of (1),
From (2) by Axiom (II) and Rule (RIN),
By taking the contraposition of (3),
where ), and
It is easy to see by the definition of Ie(n, 1, r) and Rule (RID) that:
>I(n, x, y)({^}).
(6) /(n, x, y)({^}).
From (4)- (7), we can get the desired result. Proof. Almost immediate from Axiom (14) .
Lemma 2o5.ll, // I(n 9 x, y) ({^j}) is consistent, then each A tj is consistent.
Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction that for some (i ls jj), H-i4. uV (1) Then by Rule (RIN), H/e^^^a-i^}).
It is easy to see, by the definition of Ie(n, 1 5 r) and Rule (RID), that:
From (2) and (3), H-iICn.x.jOaly}),
which is a contradiction. Proof. This follows mainly from Axiom (15) . The details are left to the reader.
Since WFF is a countable set, we can enumerate all wffs in the following manner :
In the rest of this section we fix such an enumeration. We also need an auxiliary countable set V, whose elements are : In the rest of this section we fix such V. Now, with these preparations, we can present the proof of Theorem 2.5.2. Let r o be the given consistent theory. It is sufficient to construct a Tl-model realizing this theory. The outline of the proof goes as follows :
(a) We construct a finite TDI-sequence l n = (S n , <, (v l9 v 2 ), W n ) at each stage n inductively such that :
(i) S n sF.
(ii) T 0 U {/( , , )OU} i § consistent.
(iii) A B cA (II+1) forany/i.
(b) We can get a desired Tl-model as the limit of A B 's.
To explain the detailed construction of A n 's, we need to classify all stages n into 5 cases. Given a natural number n and a prime number p, we denote by E(p, n) one plus the exponent of p in the prime decomposition of n. It is easy to see, by Axiom (10) , that I 0 u {/( , , XAj)} is consistent.
Case 2:
Suppose n is such that : (a) £(2,n) = 2. Then obviously A^.^A,,. By Lemma 2.5.7, it is easy to see that Z 0 u {/( , , )(A n )} is consistent provided I 0 U {/( , , )(^( M -i))} is consistent.
Case 3:
Suppose n is such that : Then obviously A^-^^A' and A^.D^A". By Corollary 2.5.9, it is easy to see that at least one of ! 0 U {/( , , )(A')} and I 0 U {/( , , )(A")} is consistent provided I 0 U {/( , , )(A (n _!))} is consistent. A n shall be such one of A' and A".
Case 4:
Suppose n is such that : The following lemmas follow directly from the manner of the construction of Vs.
Lemma 2.5.14. ^c^c^c^c.-.c^c....
Lemma 2.5.15. I( , , )(A n ) zs consistent for any n.
Thus we can define a TDI-sequence ^ = (5^, < 5 (t> l9 t; 2 )> ^oo) as 
Lemma 2.5*16, Z 0 c ^(t^, t? 2 ).
Proof. Immediate from the construction of A w 's of Case 2.
Lemma 2.5 8 
^^(s, f) is maximal consistent for any (s, fJe^S^ <).
Proof. Almost immediate from the construction of A n 's of Case 3, Lemma 2.5.12, and Lemma 2.5.15. Then by Lemma 2.5.17 ~\I(n, x, j;)({j4 0 -})e ^(s, t). We can conclude, by Lemma 2,5.13, that for any s £ 's (l<i<ri) such that s 1 <---<s w , s x = s and s y =f, Xy i ^oo( 5 i> 5 j) for some (/, j). This is a contradiction.
We define D^ as follows:
For any p e P and any (s, t) e /(S^, <) 3
D x (p,s,t) = l i% peV^(s,t).
We will show that (S^, <, D^, (f> ls i? 2 )) is indeed a desired Tl-modei Proposition 2.5 8 20 8 In the Tl-structure (S^, < 9 D^), /or any wjf A and (s, OG/CS., <), ||I|| (Sjt) = l iffAEV^s, t).
Proof. We can prove this by induction on the construction of wffs. similarly the arity of l(n, x, y} is n(n~ 1} +n=^+i). F or the sake of notational simplicity, we will often write M(n, z)({A t } !<;<", {Bij}^^ô r M(n, z)({XJ, {S y }) rather than M(n, z)(X l5 ..., X B , 5 12 ,..., S (B -1)n ). Similarly for I(n, x, ^({-lyl^K^, {^J^,<J or J(n, x, y)({I v }, {JJJ). We will make use of Me(n, z)({A t }, {B if }) and Ie(n, x, y)({A t j}, {B t }) as abbreviations of -iM(?i, z)({-i^J, {-iS lV }) and -i/(n, x, y)({-i J lV }, {-iB,}) respectively. Symbols for conjunction (A), disjunction (v) and material equivalence (<->) are defined as usual. Tand F are defined as abbreviations of (p^>p) and -i (p-»p) for some s-variable p respectively. T and F are defined as abbreviations of (P~*P) It is important to notice that ]|/4|| (M) and ||y4|| r are undefined at all. With the above definition, it is easy to see that:
(el) ||M <n, z)({A t } 9 {B t j})\\ t = 1 iff for any s £ 's (1 < i < n) such that s 1 < -•• <s n and s z = t, Mj|| 5f = l for some i or ||S y || (SfjSj) = l for some (1,7)-(e2) ||Mn, x, J0({^y}, {Bi})|| (li0 = l iff for any s/s (l<i<?i) such that s^-^, 5^ = 5 and s y = ^? p 0 .|| (SijS . ) = l for some (1,7) or ||BJ| S| = 1 for some i. 3)(A 19 A 2 , A 3 , A 12 , A 13 , A 23 ) . A' l39 A' 239 A' 19 A' 2 , A' 3 ) . (A^A' l9 A 29 A 3 , A 129 1 13 , A 23 ) . (1) A DM-monomorphism from a DM-set (S, <, s) to a DM-set (S', <, s') is an order monomorphism/from (S, <) to (S', <) such that/(s) = s'. (2) A DM-isomorphism from a DM-set (S, <, s) to a DM-set (S', < 5 s') is a Dl-monomorphism from (S, <, s) onto (S', <, s'). The main purpose of this section is to present the formal system IM. To do it smoothly, we need some notational conventions.
M(3,
Given a finite DMI-sequence a = (S, < , s, co, O), we can easily find out the canonical DMI-sequence a' = ([l, ri] 9 <, z, co', £2') such that a'wa. We will denote the M-wff M(n, z)({co'(i)}> {^U J)» by M(n, z)(a) or M( , )(a). We will denote the M-wff Me(n, z)({co / (0}, {^U j)» b Y Me(n, z)(a>or Me( , )(a). Given a finite DIM-sequence jS = (S, <, (s, t), co, O), the I-wfFs J(n, x, y)(f$) = I( , , )QJ) and Je(n, x, y)(j8) = /e( , , )(jS) are defined similarly. Since the outline of the proof of Theorem 3.5.2 is parallel to that of Theorem 2.5.2 and is more complicated mainly in notation or terminology, it is left to the reader as an exercise. 
T, T, T, A).
We denote this as follows :
)(T, T, T, T, T, A).
It is important to notice that (/; M)-BEFORE applies to an I-wff and then yields an M-wff. The prefix (/ ; M)-is intended for this fact. We don't need any specific tense operators corresponding to Bruce's timesegment relation "same-time", but if the reader wants to, we can easily define them as follows : Definition 4.1.5 (SAME-TIME).
(b) (/; I)-BEFORE(A)^1(4, 1, 2)(T, T, T, T, T, A, T, T, T, T). (c) (M; I)-BEFORE(A)^I(3, 1, 2)(f, T, T, T, T, A). (d) (M; M)-BEFORE(A)<^M(2, 1)(T, A, T).
(1) (a) (I; I)-SAME-TIME(A)<=1(2, 1, 2)(A 9 
T, T). (b) (M; M)-SAME-TIME(A)<*M(1, I) (A).
(2) Semantically, (a) || (/ ; I)-SAME-TIME (A) The main purpose of this section is to give several paradigmatic analyses of tense and aspect within our formal framework IM. We give these analyses only to make the reader realize that such interval logics as given in this paper, if properly developed, will render a powerful tool to formal study of tense and aspect in English. Thus the reader should not take these analyses so seriously. They are incomplete and inadequate in several major respects. So they are to be regarded as a mere sketch or a mere illustration. The reader, who wants to develop interval logics for such a direction, is recommended to consult, say, Bennett and Partee (1978) and its bibliography, to which our basic idea owes much.
Let's begin with examples that can be treated well by traditional tense operators.
(1) Mary has been happy. (2) Mary will be happy.
The analyses of these propositions go as follows :
(la) Pp, where p= "Mary is happy". (2a) Fp 9 where p= "Mary is happy' 9 .
But our analyses of the following propositions are radically different from the traditional ones.
(3) Tom has visited the museum. 
